Can the High Court heal the wounds of a bad holiday? by Croese C
However, the case of Flight Centre (referred to earlier) made it 
clear that such awards were awards of personal injury damages 
under the CLA, and subject to assessment under s 16. 
In Flight Centre, the plaintiffs claimed $10,000 for ‘incon-
venience, distress and disappointment’ after Flight Centre 
breached an implied term in a holiday contract to provide 
pleasure, relaxation and freedom from distress. Their claim 
was purely for injured feelings. They did not suffer personal 
injury as understood at common law. 
The assessor awarded $4,898.66 under the authority of Baltic 
Shipping. However, on appeal, Barr AJ applied the Court of 
Appeal cases of Insight Vacations and Corby to find the ‘inconve-
nience, distress and disappointment’ experienced by the plain-
tiffs were forms of mental impairment under s 11. Therefore, 
they were suing in respect of an ‘injury’ which attracted the ap-
plication of Part 2. (Section 3B did not exclude its application.) 
Following Insight Vacations and Corby, he held the claim was 
for non-economic loss – specifically, pain and suffering caused 
by the breach of contract – and s 16 should have been applied 
to assess the damages (at [31]). His Honour noted that, in his 
opinion, a claim for mere injured feelings would not reach the 
required threshold of 15 % of a most extreme case (at [41]).
The impact of these decisions was that in following lower 
court and tribunal decisions, plaintiffs were denied damages 
for injured feelings in causes of action which had previously 
allowed them. Even though such claims would not be consid-
ered claims in respect of personal injury at common law, Part 
2 applied to the claims because the meaning of ‘injury’ for the 
purpose of Part 2 included mere injured feelings, and Part 2 
applies irrespective of cause of action (s 11A(1)).
Scenic Tours Pty Ltd v Moore (NSWCA)
In 2018, the Court of Appeal heard the case of Scenic Tours Pty 
Ltd v Moore [2018] NSWCA 238 (‘Scenic Tours’). This case was 
a representative action in which Scenic Tours failed to provide a 
relaxing and enjoyable holiday in Europe, breaching consumer 
guarantees provided by the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’). 
The trial judge awarded $2,000 under ACL s 267(4) for dis-
tress and disappointment caused by the breach of consumer 
guarantees. A key question was whether ACL s 275 picked up 
and applied CLA s 16 to regulate that award. On the authority 
of Insight Vacations, Corby and Flight Centre, it was common 
ground that, if s 16 applied to the award, then Mr Moore’s 
injured feelings did not meet the threshold under s 16. The 
Court of Appeal found that s 16 did apply to the award and the 
award for distress and disappointment was overturned (at [391]).
Moore v Scenic Tours Pty Ltd (HCA)
Mr Moore appealed to the High Court. Part of his appeal was 
to challenge the authority that mere injured feelings are mental 
impairment and are thus an ‘injury’ for the purpose of Part 2. Mr 
Moore submitted that damages awarded to compensate distress 
or disappointment in the holiday cases are a form of expecta-
tion damages that compensate the difference between what the 
provider promised and what the customer received. Any injured 
feelings caused by the breach do not result in mental ‘impair-
ment’, but are a normal reaction to a disappointed expectation.
Mr Moore also submitted that injured feelings do not fall 
within the meaning of ‘pain and suffering’, thus attracting the 
application of s 16. He submitted the definition of non-eco-
nomic loss within the CLA (s 3) was not intended to change its 
common law meaning. As such, he submitted that ‘pain and 
suffering’ referred to subjective pain and suffering caused by 
physical injury or psychiatric illness, not mere injured feelings.
Scenic Tours’ response emphasised the wide definition of 
‘injury’ in s 11. It emphasised that, first, injured feelings fit com-
fortably within a wider understanding of the word ‘injury’ and, 
second, the NSW courts were correct to find such feelings were 
forms of mental impairment. It also submitted the legislation 
requires the court to look at the nature of the damage, rather 
than what causes it. Hence, a breach of a holiday contract impairs 
a customer’s mind because the disappointed customer is brought 
down from a heightened state of excitement and anticipation.
Scenic Tours also relied on the policy behind the enactment of 
s 16. It noted, with reference to the Minister’s second reading 
speech, that the Parliament intended to exclude small claims 
for non-economic loss damages, submitting that a Baltic Ship-
ping type claim was a ‘paradigm example’. As to whether injured 
feelings fall within the definition of non-economic loss as forms 
of pain and suffering, Scenic Tours submitted that the lines be-
tween the traditional ‘heads’ of loss overlap and are not distinct.
Consequences
Although the holiday cases have featured prominently in the 
cases considering the application of s 16 to claims in respect of 
injured feelings, more is at stake than damages for disappointed 
holiday-makers. If the High Court finds that injured feelings 
are ‘injury’ for the purpose of Part 2 – and that s 16 applies to 
assess the damages – then that poses some interesting questions 
about the scope of Part 2. Because Part 2 applies irrespective of 
cause of action, any cause of action where mere injured feelings 
are compensated may be subject to it, even if the common law 
would not have treated it as a claim in respect of personal injury.
For example, in Corby, Basten JA held that aggravated damages 
were ‘compensation for mental suffering falling short of a rec-
ognised psychiatric illness’ (at [48]). Does that mean aggravated 
damages could be subsumed by s 16?
In defamation, compensation for injured feelings can make up 
a large part of the damages awarded. Does that mean that the 
Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) is subject to s 16? 
Questions posed by the High Court bench during the appeal 
show the Court was alive to the prospect that torts like defamation 
and false imprisonment may be impacted by finding that mere 
injured feelings were injury for the purpose of Part 2. Given what 
is at stake, the High Court’s judgment is eagerly anticipated. 
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On 11 February 2020, the High Court heard Moore v Scenic Tours Pty Ltd [2020] HCATrans 7, a rep-
resentative action born out of a luxury 
European river cruise holiday that 
turned into a budget bus trip when the 
Danube was hit by record flooding in 
2013. The judgment is eagerly anticipat-
ed as it will provide much-needed clarity 
on the scope of the meaning of ‘injury’, 
‘personal injury damages’ and ‘non-eco-
nomic loss’ in Part 2 of the Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (NSW), (‘CLA’).
Legislative background
Part 2 of the CLA applies to many – if 
not most – awards of damages for per-
sonal injury in New South Wales. The 
NSW Parliament enacted Part 2 as part 
of its reform of the law of negligence in 
response to concern that personal in-
jury damages were escalating out of control, and, as a result, 
insurance premiums were becoming unaffordable. According-
ly, much of Part 2 imposes limits on awards of damages. 
Section 11A provides that Part 2 applies to awards of ‘personal 
injury damages’ regardless of whether the claim is brought ‘in 
tort, in contract, under statute or otherwise’, unless the award 
is excluded by s 3B. Section 11 defines ‘personal injury damag-
es’ as ‘damages that relate to the death of or injury to a person.’ 
Section 11 defines ‘injury’ to mean ‘personal injury’ and includes 
‘impairment of the person’s … mental condition.’ Hence, the defi-
nition of ‘injury’ for the purpose of Part 2 is not necessarily limit-
ed to the common law definition of personal injury, given that the 
Parliament has defined ‘injury’ to include mental ‘impairment’.
The common law views ‘personal injury’ as physical injury and 
mental harm consisting of a diagnosable psychiatric condition. 
Generally, mere injured feelings – such as anger, distress or 
disappointment – that are not consequent on actual personal 
injury are not compensable forms of injury in tort or contract. 
However mere injured feelings can be compensated in limit-
ed causes of action, such as trespass to person, defamation or 
for certain breaches of contract. 
Part 2 also contains s 16, which regu-
lates the assessment of non-economic 
loss damages for pain and suffering, loss 
of amenity of life, disfigurement and loss 
of expectation of life in personal injury 
claims. Section 16 limits the amount that 
can be awarded for non-economic loss 
and also provides a mechanism for assess-
ing the award, by requiring the court to 
evaluate the plaintiff’s condition as a per-
centage of a hypothetical ‘most extreme 
case’. Crucially, if the plaintiff’s condition 
is less than 15 per cent of a most extreme 
case, then the plaintiff does not receive 
any non-economic loss damages.
Injured feelings as personal injury
In 2010-2011 a series of three cases – 
Insight Vacations Pty Ltd v Young [2010] 
NSWCA 137 (‘Insight Vacations’); New 
South Wales v Corby [2010] NSWCA 27 (‘Corby’); and Flight 
Centre Ltd v Louw [2011] NSWSC 132 (‘Flight Centre’) – 
established the following propositions concerning the scope of 
the meaning of ‘injury’ in s 11 and ‘non-economic loss’ in s 16.
First, mere injured feelings – like anxiety and disappointment 
– were forms of mental ‘impairment’, and therefore within the 
definition of ‘injury’. Thus, an award of damages in respect of 
them was an award of ‘personal injury damages’ under Part 2, 
unless s 3B precluded Part 2 from applying. Second, injured 
feelings were a form of ‘pain and suffering’, so that if Part 2 
applied to the award, the court was obliged to assess the damag-
es using the procedure in s 16. One consequence of these find-
ings was that it closed off awards of damages for injured feelings 
caused by breach of contract in the so-called ‘holiday cases’.
Under Baltic Shipping Company v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344 
(‘Baltic Shipping’), it was well-recognised that a custom-
er could be compensated with damages for injured feelings 
caused by a holiday-provider’s breach of a promise to provide 
a relaxing and enjoyable holiday. There was no suggestion that 
such an award was in respect of personal injury.
• Under current NSW authority, 
it is no longer possible to 
obtain damages for injured 
feelings caused by a breach of 
a promise to provide a relaxing 
holiday.
• This is because the NSW Court 
of Appeal holds that injured 
feelings are forms of injury as 
defined in Civil Liability Act, 
which required the application 
of s 16 to assess the claim.
• The High Court will soon 
decide whether the Court 
of Appeal’s expansive 
interpretation of ‘injury’ 
is correct. This will have 
ramifications for several other 
causes of action.
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